Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of "conventional," and finally that he has not (...) established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw. (shrink)

When clinical services aspire to quality improvement, creative and innovative approaches to old problems are needed to drive such change. Whilst new ef orts should be applauded, information on this topic can be somewhat grey from an ethical and research point of view. Within the mental health profession there is currently an expectation to routinely evaluate care and disseminate i ndings. The notion of service enhancements under the guise of routine practice is an interesting and untested ethical issue. Should clinical (...) innovation continue to enjoy such impunity as patient autonomy is often compromised as they are often compelled to accept treatment under the coercion of mental health legislation? We believe that it should not. All involvement in any form of research is voluntary, thus patients should also have the right to decline participation in quality projects if they wish to do so. (shrink)

: Three major strategies exist for the protection of endangered habitat and species: (1) land acquisition programs, (2) government legislation and regulatory agencies, and (3) "stewardship" programs that are voluntary and community-based. While all of these strategies have merit, we suggest that stewardship holds particular advantages and should be considered more often as a strategy of first choice. In this article, we examine the Municipal Wetland Stewardship program of Newfoundland, a popular and successful Canadian policy for the local protection of (...) wetlands. Important issues are at stake: competing philosophical foundations for managerial ecology, the value of "local ecological knowledge," principles of community-based conservation, the question of whether stewardship empowers local communities or controls them from afar, and ethical conflicts around American colonialism, hunting, and ecotourism. The results suggest that despite some potentially problematic ironies, the Newfoundland program provides a model for a public policy aimed both at the pragmatics of biophysical sustainability and at the ideals of environmental ethics, social justice, and democratic politics. (shrink)

Three major strategies exist for the protection of endangered habitat and species: (1) land acquisition programs, (2) government legislation and regulatory agencies, and (3) "stewardship" programs that are voluntary and community-based. While all of these strategies have merit, we suggest that stewardship holds particular advantages and should be considered more often as a strategy of first choice. In this article, we examine the Municipal Wetland Stewardship program of Newfoundland, a popular and successful Canadian policy for the local protection of wetlands. (...) Important issues are at stake: competing philosophical foundations for managerial ecology, the value of "local ecological knowledge," principles of community-based conservation, the question of whether stewardship empowers local communities or controls them from afar, and ethical conflicts around American colonialism, hunting, and ecotourism. The results suggest that despite some potentially problematic ironies, the Newfoundland program provides a model for a public policy aimed both at the pragmatics of biophysical sustainability and at the ideals of environmental ethics, social justice, and democratic politics. (shrink)

The use of drones (or unmanned aerial vehicles, UVAs) in humanitarian action has emerged rapidly in the last decade and continues to expand. These so-called ‘humanitarian drones’ represent the first wave of robotics applied in the humanitarian and development contexts, providing critical information through mapping of crisis-affected areas and timely delivery of aid supplies to populations in need. Alongside these emergent uses of drones in the aid sector, debates have arisen about potential risks and challenges, presenting diverse perspectives on the (...) ethical, legal, and social implications of humanitarian drones. Guided by the methodology introduced by Arksey and O’Malley, this scoping review offers an assessment of the ethical considerations discussed in the academic and gray literature based on a screening of 1,188 articles, from which we selected and analyzed 47 articles. In particular, we used a hybrid approach of qualitative content analysis, along with quantitative landscape mapping, to inductively develop a typology of ethical considerations associated with humanitarian drones. The results yielded 11 key areas of concern: (1) minimizing harm, (2) maximizing welfare, (3) substantive justice, (4) procedural justice, (5) respect for individuals, (6) respect for communities, (7) regulatory gaps, (8) regulatory dysfunction, (9) perceptions of humanitarian aid and organizations, (10) relations between humanitarian organizations and industry, and (11) the identity of humanitarian aid providers and organizations. Our findings illuminate topics that have been the focus of extensive attention (such as minimizing risks of harm and protecting privacy), traces the evolution of this discussion over time (i.e., an initial focus on mapping drones and the distinction of humanitarian from military use, toward the ethics of cargo drones carrying healthcare supplies and samples), and points to areas that have received less consideration (e.g., whether sustainability and shared benefits will be compromised if private companies’ interest in humanitarian drones wanes once new markets open up). The review can thus help to situate and guide further analysis of drone use in humanitarian settings. (shrink)

Since the poem of Sappho, which was first published as No. 7 of the Oxyrhynchus series, has been the object of a good deal of attention and ingenuity , it is perhaps not too early to publish a number of new readings, the result of repeated examinations of the papyrus , that may provide a surer foundation for future attempts at reconstruction. I have submitted my suggestions to Professor Hunt, who does not reject them , and I have to (...) thank him and Mr. H. I. Bell, of the Department of MSS., for the readiness of their help whenever and under whatever form I made appeal to it. But, of course, neither of them is in any way committed to any of my readings or deductions. (shrink)

Let’s say that you are omniprescient iff you always believe—occurrently and with maximal confidence—all and only truths, including ones about the future. Several philosophers have argued that an omniprescient being couldn’t engage in certain kinds of activity.[1] In what follows, I present and assess the most promising such argument I know of—what I’ll call the Serious Deliberation Argument (SDA). It concludes that omniprescience rules out serious deliberation—i.e., trying to choose between incompatible courses of action once you know that none is (...) conclusively favored by your reasons.[2] The SDA—which (I’ll argue) should disturb many traditional theists—derives from an argument due to Tomis Kapitan[3]; and my favored objection to the SDA—roughly: that it fails because dependent on the alleged incompatibility of omniprescience and freedom—superficially resembles a reply to Kapitan’s argument due to David Hunt.[4] Along the way, then, I’ll briefly discuss Kapitan’s argument, and Hunt’s reply, to show how they differ from the SDA and my favored objection to it. I begin by presenting the Serious Deliberation Argument. (shrink)

The ratio of index- and ring-finger lengths is thought to be related to prenatal androgen exposure, and in many, though not all, populations, men have a lower average digit ratio than do women. In many studies an inverse relationship has been observed, among both men and women, between 2D:4D ratio and measures of athletic ability. It has been further suggested that, in hunter-gatherer populations, 2D:4D ratio might also be negatively correlated with hunting ability, itself assumed to be contingent on athleticism. (...) This hypothesis has been tested using endurance running performance among runners from a Western, educated, and industrialized population as a proximate measure of hunting ability. However, it has not previously been tested among actual hunter-gatherers using more ecologically valid measures of hunting ability and success. The current study addresses this question among Tanzanian Hadza hunter-gatherers. I employ a novel method of assessing hunting reputation that, unlike previous methods, allows granular distinctions to be made between hunters at all levels of perceived ability. I find no statistically significant relationship between digit ratio and either hunting reputation or two important hunting skills. I confirm that Hadza men have higher mean 2D:4D ratios than men in many Western populations. I discuss the notion that 2D:4D ratio may be the consequence of an allometric scaling relationship between relative and absolute finger lengths. Although it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from these results, the current study provides no support for the theorized relationship between 2D:4D ratio and hunting skill. (shrink)

Eichenbaum et al.'s (1994a) theory suffers from a lack of ecological validation. It is not at all clear why the hypothesized faculties would have evolved and what their adaptive value would be. I argue that hippocampal function can only be understood if the animal is seen in its natural context.

The ratio of index- and ring-finger lengths is thought to be related to prenatal androgen exposure, and in many, though not all, populations, men have a lower average digit ratio than do women. In many studies an inverse relationship has been observed, among both men and women, between 2D:4D ratio and measures of athletic ability. It has been further suggested that, in hunter-gatherer populations, 2D:4D ratio might also be negatively correlated with hunting ability, itself assumed to be contingent on athleticism. (...) This hypothesis has been tested using endurance running performance among runners from a Western, educated, and industrialized population as a proximate measure of hunting ability. However, it has not previously been tested among actual hunter-gatherers using more ecologically valid measures of hunting ability and success. The current study addresses this question among Tanzanian Hadza hunter-gatherers. I employ a novel method of assessing hunting reputation that, unlike previous methods, allows granular distinctions to be made between hunters at all levels of perceived ability. I find no statistically significant relationship between digit ratio and either hunting reputation or two important hunting skills. I confirm that Hadza men have higher mean 2D:4D ratios than men in many Western populations. I discuss the notion that 2D:4D ratio may be the consequence of an allometric scaling relationship between relative and absolute finger lengths. Although it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from these results, the current study provides no support for the theorized relationship between 2D:4D ratio and hunting skill. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A rereading of the American scientific literature on sex determination from 1902 to 1926 leads to a different understanding of the construction of the Mendelian‐chromosome theory after 1910. There was significant intellectual continuity, which has not been properly appreciated, underlying this scientific “revolution.” After reexamining the relationship between the ideas of key scientists, in particular Edmund B. Wilson and Thomas Hunt Morgan, I argue that, contrary to the historical literature, Wilson and Morgan did not adopt opposing views on (...) Mendelism and sex determination. Rather, each preferred a non‐Mendelian explanation of the determination of sex. Around 1910, both integrated the Mendelian and non‐Mendelian theories to create a synthetic theory. One problem was the need to avoid an overly deterministic view of sex while also accepting the validity of Mendelism. Morgan’s discovery of mutations on the X chromosome takes on different significance when set in the context of the debate about sex determination, and Calvin Bridges’s work on sex determination is better seen as a development of Morgan’s ideas, rather than a departure from them. Conclusions point to the role of synthesis within fields as a way to advance scientific theories and reflect on the relationship between synthesis and explanatory “pluralism” in biology. (shrink)

Three main ethical issues involved in the management of whales and small cetaceans are examined: ethical values concerning extinction and their implications for consumptive management regimes, the humaneness of current and feasible future harvesting techniques, and the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for various uses. I argue that objections to human-caused extinction are primarily ethical, and that the ethical discussion must be expanded to include greater consideration of acceptable risks and problems associated with extinction due to human-caused genetic selection. Whaling (...) methods are objectively described including death times for whales. I show that the debate on humaneness is not about the facts of the hunt, but about the appropriate standard for judging whether or not a technique ishumane. Economic and ecological arguments which attempt to preempt the ethical questions are discussed and dismissed as specious. Arguments which attempt to distinguish ethically human relations with cetaceans from relations with other wildlife species are reviewed critically. (shrink)

Three main ethical issues involved in the management of whales and small cetaceans are examined: ethical values concerning extinction and their implications for consumptive management regimes, the humaneness of current and feasible future harvesting techniques, and the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for various uses. I argue that objections to human-caused extinction are primarily ethical, and that the ethical discussion must be expanded to include greater consideration of acceptable risks and problems associated with extinction due to human-caused genetic selection. Whaling (...) methods are objectively described including death times for whales. I show that the debate on humaneness is not about the facts of the hunt, but about the appropriate standard for judging whether or not a technique ishumane. Economic and ecological arguments which attempt to preempt the ethical questions are discussed and dismissed as specious. Arguments which attempt to distinguish ethically human relations with cetaceans from relations with other wildlife species are reviewed critically. (shrink)

What are the objects of thought? To consider a familiar case, may we assert that the proposition “I am thinking of a unicorn” entails that there is some object which is being thought of? Theories of subsistent objects provide an affirmative answer and seem to be based on the consideration that we are thinking of something when we think of a unicorn. Otherwise, to paraphrase G. E. Moore's well known statement of the argument, we would be thinking of the same (...) thing whether we thought of a unicorn or a griffen, namely, nothing. But, as G. E. Moore has shown, subsistence theories fail to distinguish between the logical and grammatical forms of such statements as “I am thinking of a unicorn” and “I am hunting a lion”. The latter is of the form · φx · Ψx; the former is not since it does not assert that the property of being a unicorn and the property of thought of by me both belong to something. But the problem that suggests itself is the nature of the contention that something is being thought of when, for example, we think of a unicorn. To begin with, is there no acceptable alternative to the various forms of the theory of subsistent objects according to which it would be correct to say that the proposition “I am thinking of a unicorn” entails the proposition “·x is being thought of”? And if saying that we are thinking of something, when we think of a unicorn, does not mean that there exists something that is being thought of, what is the force of the contention that we are thinking of something? (shrink)

Frant︠s︡uzʹka revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii︠a︡: prokhodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ cherez smertʹ -- Romantyzm i khytristʹ dobra: Mefistofel i︠a︡k kulʹturnyĭ heroĭ -- Narodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ totalʹnosti: slabkistʹ indyvida, syla kolektyvnykh til -- Klas i︠a︡k hrupa obranykh: marksyzm -- Rasa i︠a︡k "use": rasyzm i zakhid -- Hotui︠u︡chysʹ do katastrof: palinhenesii︠a︡ i kinet︠s︡ʹ stolitti︠a︡ -- Fashyzm: triumf transheokratiï -- Nat︠s︡yzm: rasa i︠a︡ zakon -- Komunizm: vid emansypat︠s︡iï do rabstva -- Rosiĭsʹka ideolohii︠a︡: sumishi ta ekstremy -- Zamistʹ vysnovkiv: plynnistʹ ideolohiĭ i XXI stolitti︠a︡.

This paper examines confidentiality and its nature and analyses the guidelines laid down by the Hippocratic Oath as well as the British and World Medical Associations for maintaining such confidentiality between doctor and patient. There are exceptions to practically any code of rules and this is true also for confidentiality. Some of these exceptions make it appear that very little is confidential. The three values implicit in confidentiality would seem to be privacy, confidence and secrecy. Each of these values is (...) discussed and developed in this paper. In conclusion, the question is suggested that maybe in the face of death, doctor and patient need to re-examine the pre-suppositions of privacy, confidence and secrecy on which the confidential relationship is based. (shrink)

This paper critically examines John Mark Mattox's view of the nature of the moral appropriateness of particular response options. By so doing, I aim to engage the wider readership in a debate, which I hope leads to greater clarity and precision of thinking on these topics. After summarizing Mattox's view, I argue first that in order for Mattox's ultimate conclusion to hold in moral terms, he must abandon the argument on the permissibility of nuclear reprisal to re-establish nuclear deterrence and (...) instead anchor this response solely on the moral grounds of retributive justice. Secondly, I argue that the morally superior and politically efficacious counter-nuclear terrorist response is to hunt down the nuclear terrorists and hold them accountable for war crimes in the International Criminal Court. This response is consistent with just war theoretic principles, and it also affirms the moral virtues of honor, dignity, and humane treatment in contexts where they are needed the most? the holocausts of nuclear terrorist attacks. (shrink)

On World Philosophy Day, November 15, 2018, the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences organized the international conference on the Russian classic writer I.S. Turgenev. During the plenary and two breakout sessions, speeches were given by philosophers, cultural researchers, historians ofRussia,USA,Germany,Austria. The conference’s attitude to the consideration of the multifaceted heritage of the great Russian writer made it possible to highlight in the modern historical and cultural context many aspects of Turgenev’s work, to rethink stereotypes existing among (...) researchers and in the mass consciousness regarding Turgenev. At the conference, Turgenev was presented as a political thinker, a liberal who embodied spiritual asceticism, a supporter of the dialogue of cultures, a “Russian European” who does not accept “new barbarism” in all its manifestations from radicalism to Russian exclusivity idea. In the reports and speeches, attention was drawn to the cultural bilingualism inherent in Turgenev, his ability of non-biased artistic and philosophical observation, which enabled him to analyze the then state of minds in Russian society, to foresee many collisions inherent in the national historical process in the 20th – early 21st centuries and world cultural trends engendered by the “uprising of the masses,” to anticipate the drama of the absurd. At the conference, among the discussed topics were the themes of nihilism and loneliness, viewed through the prism of the existential experience of the writer and world literary characters. (shrink)

Kant does not provide clear-cut definitions of apperception, consciousness, and self-consciousness and everywhere uses these terms as synonyms, which creates the problem of the relationship between these faculties. The importance of this problem stems from the colossal significance of each of the above-mentioned faculties which are intimately connected with Kant’s formulation of the key tasks of transcendental philosophy. The prime task is to discover the categories of understanding and to prove the legitimacy of their use, a task that is further (...) complicated by the difference between the editions of the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of the argumentation in the section on the deduction of categories and Kant’s concept of apperception. Accordingly, the author seeks to clarify the purpose of each of the above-mentioned faculties and to establish their inter-relationship. To this end the author analyses the functional roles of consciousness, self-consciousness and apperception in solving the main tasks of the first Critique. It turns out that consciousness is a reflexive cognitive capacity which provides access to representations in our soul and allows us to distinguish them and to connect them. Self-consciousness is the mode of the functioning of consciousness which makes it possible to study three objects of consciousness: internal and external representations of the subject, the synthetic activity of understanding and our soul. Apperception is the Latin synonym of the concept of Selbstbewußtsein and is aimed at studying the unity of our representations. Because Kant distinguishes multiple kinds of unity, there are different names for apperception. Kant uses the concept of Apperzeption as a synonym of self-consciousness because his concept of consciousness follows the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition. (shrink)

vyp. 1. Obshchestvennyi︠a︡ nauki i teoreticheskai︠a︡ filosofīi︠a︡.

t. 1.Novoe mirovozzrenie i novai͡a teorii͡a nauki -- t. 2. [without special title].